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IS ENHANCED JUDICIAL REVIEW THE CORRECT
ANTIDOTE TO EXCESSIVE STATE PREEMPTION?*
PAUL A. DILLER**
In proposing a new system of constitutional home rule, the National League of
Cities’ Principles of Home Rule for the 21st Century (“Principles”) would
empower the judiciary to police preemption in a manner akin to older systems of
home rule adopted in the late nineteenth century. Because legislatures have
abused their power to police local governments under the more modern legislative
home rule, the Principles reasons, states should again designate the judiciary as
a backup supervisor of the state-local divide. This Article examines the
judiciary’s potential strengths and weaknesses as a home-rule policeman from an
institutional perspective. It surveys the real-world examples of California and
Colorado, two states whose judiciaries have played a prominent role in
supervising preemption for decades. The Article also assesses how interest-based
tier scrutiny, which the Principles proposes as the methodology judges use to
review preemption, might mesh with state constitutional jurisprudence. In doing
so, the Article considers alternative methods of judicial review—proportionality
and reasonableness—that are popular in other constitutional regimes. The
Article concludes that reformers should proceed carefully and analyze the statespecific benefits and drawbacks of placing supervisory authority for home rule in
state courts.
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INTRODUCTION
The conception of cities in the United States as “creatures” of the state
derives from Judge John Dillon’s 1872 treatise, The Law of Municipal
Corporations, that announced the infamous “Dillon’s Rule” that local
governments bemoan to this day.1 Even in states with “home rule,” the doctrine
of state supremacy has eroded city power due to increasingly aggressive
preemption by state legislatures. For this reason, the National League of Cities’
(“NLC”) Principles of Home Rule for the 21st Century (“Principles”) suggests model
constitutional language that invites the state judiciary to protect local authority
from legislative overreach.2 Namely, the Principles allows for express
preemption of general local regulatory powers “only if necessary to serve a
substantial state interest [and] only if narrowly tailored to that interest.”3 With
respect to state law that preempts matters of local democratic self-government,
the proposal calls for allowing such preemption only if “the state is acting to
advance an overriding state concern . . . [and] only if narrowly tailored to that
interest.”4

1. JOHN F. DILLON, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 78 (2d ed. 1873).
2. The NLC describes itself as “an organization comprised of city, town and village leaders that
are focused on improving the quality of life for their current and future constituents.” See About, NLC,
https://www.nlc.org/about/ [https://perma.cc/Q4N6-MYFA]. Claiming that it has earned “the trust
and support of more than 2,000 cities across the nation,” the NLC’s mission “is to strengthen local
leadership, influence federal policy and drive innovative solutions.” Id. One political scientist has
described the NLC as “[a] traditional, bottom-up membership organization [of state municipal
associations] with a decentralized federal structure . . . primarily concerned with building cross-city
networks . . . .” THOMAS K. OGORZALEK, THE CITIES ON THE HILL 73 (2018).
3. See NAT’L LEAGUE OF CITIES, PRINCIPLES OF HOME RULE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY
(2020), as reprinted in 100 N.C. L. REV. 1329, 1351–52 (2022) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES]. The Principles
also requires that such preemption take place through a “general law,” which it further defines by
reference to Ohio’s case law on the matter. Id. at 1369–71.
4. Id. at 1352. As with preemption of local regulatory authority, this kind of preemption must
also take place through “a general law.” Id.
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In requiring that preemptive legislation meet a substantive standard—
“substantial state interest” or “overriding state concern”—and adopting
something like narrow-tailoring scrutiny for judicial home-rule analysis, the
Principles treads on both old and new ground. Some states—most notably,
California and Colorado—have judiciaries that are actively involved in policing
the boundaries of the state-local division of power through their interpretation
of those states’ constitutional home-rule provisions.5 However, in most other
states that use something like “legislative” home rule, courts do not regularly
weigh in on the legitimacy of state preemption.6 Rather, in these states, courts
generally take the validity of the state interest at face value. Why else would a
sufficient number of state legislators vote for—and a governor sign—a law
unless there was a “substantial” or “overriding” state interest of some type?7
Of course, the well-known maladies of the legislature’s composition and
legislative process—such as gerrymandering, logrolling, and special-interest
influence—and the legislature’s occasional lack of subject-matter expertise,
inevitably complicate the question of whether the legislature has a “substantial”
or “overriding” interest in a particular matter on which it has overridden local
preferences. Recognizing these critiques of the legislative process invites a
discussion of comparative institutional competence. Which branch(es) and
processes of state government would be better at producing or checking
legislation that represents a “substantial” or “overriding” state interest,
assuming such a thing can be said to exist in any objective way? Inviting the
judiciary to review the legislature’s work robustly is necessarily an endorsement
of that branch’s capability to answer these questions in a credible way and,
indeed, in a manner that is superior to just the legislature.8
Seeking to address the problem of “hyper” preemption—that is, the
unprecedented state preemption of local power in both scope and method of the
5. See infra Part III.
6. For a discussion of the meaning of “legislative” home rule, see infra Part I.
7. City of La Grande v. Pub. Emps. Ret. Bd., 576 P.2d 1204, 1213–14 (Or. 1978), aff’d on reh’g,
586 P.2d 765 (Or. 1978) (“Nor is it generally useful to define a ‘subject’ of legislation and assign it to
one or the other level of government. . . . A search for a predominant state or local interest in the
‘subject matter’ of legislation can only substitute for the political process . . . the court’s own political
judgment whether the state or the local policy should prevail.”).
8. Of course, preemptive legislation does not involve just the legislature insofar as the governor
usually signs legislation (in the absence of a veto override). In approximately twenty states, there is
also the possibility of voter initiatives creating legislation that can preempt. See Paul A. Diller, The
Political Process of Preemption, 54 U. RICH. L. REV. 343, 382 (2020) [hereinafter Diller, Political Process].
Moreover, as the reaction to the COVID-19 pandemic has demonstrated clearly, there is also the
possibility of state preemption by executive order. See generally Carol S. Weissert, Matthew J.
Uttermark, Kenneth R. Mackie & Alexandra Artiles, Governors in Control: Executive Orders, State-Local
Preemption, and the COVID-19 Pandemic, 51 PUBLIUS 396 (2021) (examining the executive orders by
governors made during the first five months of the COVID-19 pandemic). This Article will focus
primarily on preemption by the legislature but will occasionally address these other types of preemption
as well.
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last decade or so—the Principles invites the state judiciary to police state-local
boundaries yet again.9 Indeed, the Principles invites judicial supervision more
than any home-rule model since the “imperio” reforms of the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries by expressly importing into state constitutional
law the federal model of judicial tier-based scrutiny review of legislative
enactments into state constitutional law.10 Because this would constitute a sea
change in the way in which most states approach preemption, it is incumbent
upon the proponents of the Principles to explain what exactly the judiciary has
to offer that the legislature (and other actors in the lawmaking process) do not.
This Article attempts to engage in that comparative analysis and, in so doing,
proceeds in four parts.
Part I lays out the background of state-local relations, including the
gradual drift toward mostly “legislative” home rule by the middle of the
twentieth century, and how this evolution of home rule left cities vulnerable to
sweeping preemption. Part II assesses the institutional capabilities of the
judiciary and why it may, or may not, be better suited to serving as a “check”
on preemption than are legislatures. Part III analyzes the history of judicial
review of city-state disputes, focusing in particular on California and Colorado,
where the judiciary already plays a much larger role in policing preemption than
in most other states. Since the Principles proposes a form of tier-based scrutiny
review for judges to use in assessing preemption, Part IV discusses general
criticisms of tier-based scrutiny as a jurisprudential tool, including critiques of
previous attempts by state judiciaries to use it in interpreting their
constitutions.
I. CITIES (IN MOST STATES) ARE HIGHLY VULNERABLE TO PREEMPTION
The earliest versions of constitutional home rule that emerged in the late
1800s granted substantive lawmaking power to cities, but have often been
described as limiting this authority generally to matters of “local” concern.
When a city acted within the sphere of “local” concern, its actions were
9. Erin Adele Scharff, Hyper Preemption: A Reordering of the State-Local Relationship?, 106 GEO.
L.J. 1469, 1494–507 (2018). Another commentator, Bradley Pough, has called this phenomenon “super
preemption,” Bradley Pough, Understanding the Rise of Super Preemption in State Legislatures, 34 J.L. &
POL. 67, 69 (2018), while Professor Richard Briffault calls it the “new preemption,” Richard Briffault,
The Challenge of the New Preemption, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1995, 1997 (2018) [hereinafter Briffault, Challenge
of the New Preemption]. For more on the phenomenon, irrespective of nomenclature, see Richard C.
Schragger, The Attack on American Cities, 96 TEX. L. REV. 1163 (2018) [hereinafter Schragger, Attack
on American Cities]; RICHARD BRIFFAULT, NESTOR DAVIDSON, PAUL A. DILLER, OLATUNDE
JOHNSON & RICHARD C. SCHRAGGER, AM. CONST. SOC’Y FOR L. & POL’Y, THE TROUBLING
TURN IN STATE PREEMPTION: THE ASSAULT ON PROGRESSIVE CITIES AND HOW CITIES CAN
RESPOND (2017) [hereinafter ACS ISSUE BRIEF], https://www.acslaw.org/wp-content/uploads/
2017/09/ACS_Issue_Brief_-_Preemption_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/7YLM-5QL3] (discussing recent
examples of preemption and conflicts between states and cities).
10. For a discussion on the meaning of “imperio” home rule, see infra Part I.
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protected from state interference.11 That is, even if the state legislature wanted
to preempt a city ordinance or charter provision that regulated a matter of
“local” concern, it was prohibited from doing so, particularly if the state’s homerule system was enshrined in the state’s constitution.12 As a result, many early
home-rule regimes have been described as establishing separate—and
exclusive—jurisdictions whose areas of authority do not overlap, thereby
creating little potential for preemption.13
This earlier form of home rule is sometimes called “imperio” because it
establishes an “imperium in imperio,” or a “government within a government.”14
This description was never entirely accurate, but imperio home rule was clearly
different conceptually, even if not always in application, from the “legislative”
versions of home rule that succeeded it.15 Early home-rule provisions, like
Missouri’s 1875 constitutional amendment, at least nominally increased cities’
organic policymaking authority beyond Dillon’s Rule.16 Under Dillon’s Rule,
cities had only a small core of essential powers in addition to those that the state
legislature may have delegated; courts were supposed to interpret even the
delegated powers narrowly.17 Under imperio home rule, by contrast, cities had
the unquestioned power to run their “local” affairs, but state courts nonetheless
were the ultimate arbiters of city power because they had the power to interpret
the extent of such “local” powers.18 Despite imperio seemingly improving on
Dillon’s Rule from the perspective of municipal power, advocates of city power
11. See David J. Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2255, 2290 (2003).
12. E.g., Kansas City v. Scarritt, 29 S.W. 845, 848 (Mo. 1895) (invalidating a state law that
“relate[d] solely to matters of internal municipal government” and conflicted with provisions of a city’s
charter).
13. See, e.g., City of New Orleans v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 640 So. 2d 237, 242 (La. 1994) (stating
that, under the old system of home rule, the city acted “without fear of the supervisory authority of the
state government” so long as it acted in the “local” realm only).
14. City of St. Louis v. W. Union Tel. Co., 149 U.S. 465, 468 (1893); City of New Orleans, 640
So. 2d at 242–43 (reviewing the “imperio” model of home rule); Terrance Sandalow, The Limits of
Municipal Power Under Home Rule: A Role for the Courts, 48 MINN. L. REV. 643, 660–61 (1964).
15. Judge David Barron, writing as a Harvard law professor, argued that the early home-rule
movement actually confined local power to “a quasi-private sphere” even more effectively than Dillon’s
Rule. See Barron, supra note 11, at 2291–300.
16. For more on Missouri’s 1875 home-rule amendment, see Henry J. Schmandt, Municipal Home
Rule in Missouri, 1953 WASH. U. L.Q. 385, 385 (citing MO. CONST. art. IX, §§ 16, 20 (1875)). There
is some question as to how well-established Dillon’s Rule was as a matter of state constitutional law
across the country by the time of the early home-rule movement. After all, Dillon only wrote the first
draft of his treatise three years before Missouri established home rule. See, e.g., Paul A. Diller, The
Partly Fulfilled Promise of Home Rule in Oregon, 87 OR. L. REV. 939, 943 (2009) [hereinafter Diller,
Partly Fulfilled Promise] (noting that the Oregon courts did not always follow an approach akin to
Dillon’s Rule before the state constitution’s 1906 “home rule” amendment).
17. Dillon’s Rule traces its lineage to Iowa Supreme Court Justice John J. Dillon, who later
became a federal appellate court judge. Justice Dillon articulated something like Dillon’s Rule first in
Clark v. City of Des Moines, 19 Iowa 199, 212 (1865), and then later more clearly in his first treatise on
municipal corporations in 1873. DILLON, supra note 1, at 173.
18. Barron, supra note 11, at 2325–26; Sandalow, supra note 14, at 660.
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over time grew increasingly frustrated with state courts because judges often
interpreted “local” quite narrowly, thereby curtailing cities’ policymaking
authority.19
It is important to keep imperio home rule’s cautionary example in mind as
the Principles again proposes enhanced judicial review to protect local rule. The
judiciary had a chance once to protect local authority, and it used that power to
limit local authority.20 To be sure, the Principles contains all kinds of safeguards
that were not present in earlier imperio home-rule provisions: for example, it
abrogates Dillon’s Rule clearly and emphatically;21 it creates a presumption
against preemption; and it requires that preemption be express only.22 It is
difficult to imagine a court manipulating the whole of these provisions, if
adopted into a state’s constitution, into antilocal tools. Nonetheless, the history
of imperio home rule is one of many examples of constitutional language having
unanticipated consequences.23
In response to the perceived failures of imperio home rule, the American
Municipal Association (“AMA”)24 and the National Municipal League
(“NML”),25 proposed legislative home-rule models in the 1950s and 1960s that
granted either the “police power” or all legislative power to local governments,
subject to denial of that power in a particular area by specific act of the state
legislature.26 Legislative home rule differed significantly from the imperio
approach in that it did not offer cities any realm of regulation to be protected

19. See Sandalow, supra note 14, at 685–92.
20. See id.
21. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, at 1364 (noting that proposed language “clearly repudiate[s]
Dillon’s Rule as applied to home-rule governments”).
22. Id. at 1366 (stating that no implied preemption is allowed).
23. There are all kinds of examples of this phenomenon in constitutional law. Two well-known
ones are the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection doctrine—originally passed to protect freed
slaves from discrimination—then being used to limit affirmative action, Regents of the Univ. of Cal.
v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 396 (1978) (Marshall, J., concurring) (“[The Fourteenth Amendment’s] history
[does not] lend any support to the conclusion that a university may not remedy the cumulative effects
of society’s discrimination by giving consideration to race in an effort to increase the number and
percentage of Negro doctors.”), and the First Amendment’s free speech provisions, which have been
used to protect corporate donations to political campaigns, see Citizens United v. Fed. Election
Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 430 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“As a matter of original expectations, then,
it seems absurd to think that the First Amendment prohibits legislatures from taking into account the
corporate identity of a sponsor of electoral advocacy.”).
24. The AMA became known as the National League of Cities in 1964. See PRINCIPLES, supra
note 3, at 1330.
25. The NML is now known as the National Civic League, although it is unclear when exactly
this name change occurred. See History, NAT’L CIVIC LEAGUE, https://www.nationalcivicleague.org/
history/ [https://perma.cc/HE8T-ZEJF].
26. See JEFFERSON B. FORDHAM, AM. MUN. ASS’N, MODEL CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
FOR MUNICIPAL HOME RULE 13–24 (1953); NAT’L MUN. LEAGUE, MODEL STATE CONSTITUTION
§ 8.02 (6th ed. 1968); Barron, supra note 11, at 2326–27; Sandalow, supra note 14, at 685–92.
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by the judiciary from state legislative infringement.27 On the other hand,
legislative home rule, which has become the majority approach,28 vastly
expanded the areas in which municipalities could govern in many states through
its wholesale delegation of state power. The courts remained involved in
policing the state-local divide primarily through their more limited role in
deciding cases of implied preemption.29
As the Preamble to the Principles makes clear, the pace, scope, and ferocity
of express preemption by state legislatures has accelerated significantly in the
last decade.30 Numerous commentators in the last five years have highlighted
this dynamic, referring to it, alternatively, as “hyper-,” “super-,” or “the new”
preemption.31 The preemption has been notable in its breadth. Some
preemption has been anticipatory and largely performative in prohibiting any
local jurisdiction in the state from enacting a certain kind of law before any city
even seriously considered such a move.32 Moreover, the last decade has seen an
27. The NML model slightly enhanced the protection afforded to local governments provided by
the AMA model in that the NML model required the state legislature to deny municipal power only
by general law. Some states that have adopted the NML model have interpreted it to require express
denial of a certain local power by the state legislature in order to preempt. See City of New Orleans v.
Bd. of Comm’rs, 640 So. 2d 237, 243 (La. 1994) (comparing both models). Many states with legislative
home rule have, nonetheless, expressly reserved the broad and vaguely defined area of “private law”—
which is often interpreted to include contracts, property, torts, and family relations—for the state. See
generally Paul A. Diller, The City and the Private Right of Action, 64 STAN. L. REV. 1109 (2012)
[hereinafter Diller, Private Right of Action] (examining the definition of “private law” and the different
ways in which courts have applied the private law exception to municipal home rule); Gary T.
Schwartz, The Logic of Home Rule and the Private Law Exception, 20 UCLA L. REV. 671 (1973)
(examining similarly how courts have interpreted the private law exception and arguing in favor of the
doctrine). Because the area of “private law” is so broad that it might swallow cities’ home-rule authority,
many states allow municipal encroachments into this area so long as they are incidental to the exercise
of an independent city power. See City of Atlanta v. McKinney, 454 S.E.2d 517, 520 (Ga. 1995) (citing
GA. CODE ANN. § 36-35-6 (LEXIS through the 2021 Reg. and Spec. Sess. of the Gen. Assemb.));
New Mexicans for Free Enter. v. City of Santa Fe, 126 P.3d 1149, 1160–64 (N.M. Ct. App. 2005).
28. See Paul A. Diller, Intrastate Preemption, 87 B.U. L. REV. 1113, 1126–27 (2007) [hereinafter
Diller, Intrastate Preemption] (observing that however one counts it, legislative home-rule states are in
the majority of home-rule jurisdictions).
29. See Briffault, Challenge of the New Preemption, supra note 9, at 1997 (“Traditionally, preemption
consisted of a judicial determination of whether a new local law conflicted with preexisting state law.”).
See generally Diller, Intrastate Preemption, supra note 28 (discussing the doctrine of intrastate implied
preemption and problems therewith).
30. PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, at 1366.
31. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. Even the popular press picked up on the trend.
See, e.g., Emily Badger, Blue Cities Want To Make Their Own Rules. Red States Won’t Let Them,
N.Y. TIMES (July 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/06/upshot/blue-cities-want-to-maketheir-own-rule-red-states-wont-let-them.html?searchResultPosition=1 [http://perma.cc/4T7S-XGVD
(dark archive)] (“In the last few years, Republican-controlled state legislatures have intensified the use
of what are known as pre-emption laws . . . wall[ing] off whole new realms where local governments
aren’t allowed to govern at all.”).
32. Anticipatory preemption was frequent in the early part of the 2010s with respect to food
labeling and potential nutrition regulation. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 16, 2018, ch. 17, § 2, 2018 Ariz. Sess.
Laws 68, 74–75 (codified at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-6015 (2018)) (preempting soda taxes before
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explosion of “punitive” preemption.33 This form of preemption includes
punishments like loss of funds for noncompliant cities, removal from office—
and even potential imprisonment—of local officials who support or fail to repeal
preempted policies, and the authorization of lawsuits against cities and local
officials (sometimes in their personal capacity) who support preempted
measures.34
Republican-controlled state legislatures in states with Republican
governors (“Red Trifectas”) have been particularly apt to adopt these kinds of
policies, and often for “hot-button” issues like immigration, firearm safety, and,
more recently, controlling protests, defunding the police, and measures related
to the COVID-19 pandemic.35 Indeed, Red Trifectas—with legislative
majorities often created or enlarged by gerrymandering—preempting large,
any municipality in Arizona had enacted them); Jeffrey Hess, Soda Wars Backlash: Mississippi Passes
‘Anti-Bloomberg’ Bill, NPR (Mar. 12, 2013), https://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2013/03/ 12/1740486
23/mississippi-passes-anti-bloomberg-bill [https://perma.cc/53JF-CPEL] (discussing the Mississippi
Legislature’s passage of a bill that prohibited something like New York City’s sugar-sweetenedbeverage portion-cap rule (often inaccurately referred to as a “soda ban”)). See generally Paul A. Diller,
Local Health Agencies, the Bloomberg Soda Rule, and the Ghost of Woodrow Wilson, 40 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 1859 (2013) [hereinafter Diller, Local Health Agencies] (providing more detail on New York City’s
proposed “soda ban”).
33. See Briffault, Challenge of the New Preemption, supra note 9, at 2002–07 (discussing punitive
preemption).
34. Id.; see also PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, at 1375–77 (discussing recent trends of “punitive
preemption”); RICHARD BRIFFAULT, LOC. SOLS. SUPPORT CTR., PUNITIVE PREEMPTION: AN
UNPRECEDENTED ATTACK ON LOCAL DEMOCRACY 2 (2018), https://www.abetterbalance.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/10/Punitive-Preemption-White-Paper-FINAL-8.6.18.pdf [https://perma.cc/K
XW5-ZKGT] (describing punitive preemption as “especially threatening”); Joshua S. Sellers & Erin
A. Scharff, Preempting Politics: State Power and Local Democracy, 72 STAN. L. REV. 1361, 1376 (2020)
(“Along similar lines, some states have gone so far as to pass punitive preemption laws, which punish
jurisdictions or their elected officials for enacting ordinances that conflict with state laws.” (footnote
omitted)).
35. See, e.g., Rachel Proctor May, Punitive Preemption and the First Amendment, 55 S.D. L. REV. 1,
13–21 (2018) (discussing punitive preemption provisions passed by Republican legislatures in Arizona
and Texas). On defunding the police, see Act of June 1, 2021, ch. 197, 2021 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. (West)
(codified at TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.03(c) (West 2021)); Act of June 1, 2021, ch. 199, 2021 Tex.
Sess. Law Serv. (West) (codified in scattered sections of TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN., TEX. LOC. GOV’T
CODE ANN. & TEX. TAX CODE ANN.); Act of June 1, 2021, ch. 201, 2021 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. (West)
(codified at TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 120 (West 2021)); see also Megan Munce, Gov. Greg
Abbott Signs Slate of Legislation To Increase Criminal Penalties for Protesters, Punish Cities That Reduce Police
Budgets, TEX. TRIB. (June 1, 2021, 3:00 PM), https://www.texastribune.org/2021/06/01/texas-abbottdefund-police-protest/ [https://perma.cc/R893-LRJU]. For Florida’s “anti-riot” law, also known as
H.B. 1, see Act of Apr. 20, 2021, ch. 6, Fla. Sess. Law Serv. (West) (codified in scattered sections of
FLA. STAT.) (increasing penalties for persons who block roadways or deface public monuments and
creating new crime of “mob intimidation”). A federal judge has enjoined enforcement of the part of
Florida’s law that broadened the definition of “riot” and increased penalties for rioting. See Dream
Defenders v. DeSantis, No. 21CV191, 2021 WL 4099437, at *33 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 9, 2021) (enjoining
enforcement of FLA. STAT. § 870.01 (2021)). On Republican preemption of local COVID-19 measures,
such as shutdown orders and masking requirements, see Weissert et al., supra note 8, at 401–02; see also
Keith Boeckelman & Jonathan Day, State Legislation Restricting and Enabling Local Governments in an
Era of Preemption, 53 ST. & LOC. GOV’T REV. 210, 212 (2021).
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Democratic-leaning cities from enacting policy priorities has been a focus of
much academic research of late, including by some of the authors of the
Principles.36 But this has hardly been the only statewide dynamic within which
preemption emerges. States with Democratic-controlled legislatures and
Democratic governors (“Blue Trifectas”) have also preempted local
governments in their states. Their geographical targets are often suburbs or
smaller, more sparsely populated towns and counties that lean more rightward
politically,37 but in some instances Blue Trifectas have also preempted the policy
priorities, such as minimum wage and soda taxes, of large and left-leaning cities
in their states.38
Mixed governments—that is, states in which more than one political party
controls either of one house of the state legislature or the governor’s mansion—
too have engaged in aggressive preemption: In 2012, for instance, Kentucky
preempted local authority to regulate firearms with potential criminal and civil
penalties for local officials who violate this law.39 A Democratic state house
member sponsored the law, a Democratic-controlled state house and

36. See Diller, Political Process, supra note 8, at 364–81 (highlighting this phenomenon in Florida,
Michigan, North Carolina, Ohio, and Wisconsin); Schragger, Attack on American Cities, supra note 9,
at 1190–91.
37. E.g., City of Huntington Beach v. Becerra, 257 Cal. Rptr. 3d 458, 463 (Ct. App. 2020)
(holding that the California Values Act, passed in 2018, which restricted the ability of local law
enforcement agencies to aid federal immigration authorities, was constitutional as applied to charter
cities because it addressed a matter of “statewide concern”); see also California Values Act, ch. 495, 2017
Cal. Stat. 3733 (codified in scattered sections of CAL. GOV’T CODE & CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE).
38. See, e.g., Diller, Political Process, supra note 8, at 363 n.100 (describing the Rhode Island
General Assembly’s preemption of Providence’s effort to increase its minimum wage in 2014); see also
Peter Makhlouf, Laboring for Democracy: On the Minimum Wage in Rhode Island, COLL HILL INDEP.
(Apr. 3, 2015), https://www.theindy.org/585 [https://perma.cc/3WP6-4FX8] (discussing the National
Restaurant Association’s influence on the Rhode Island legislature’s preemption of Providence’s
proposed minimum wage ordinance); Keep Groceries Affordable Act, ch. 61, 2018 Cal. Stat. 1843
(codified at CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 7284.12 (West 2021)) (forbidding local taxes on “groceries,”
including soda and sugar-sweetened drinks, through 2030). In Oregon, the legislature preempted local
authority to tax soda and other groceries less than a year after voters defeated a similar measure at the
polls. Diller, Political Process, supra note 8, at 398–99 (discussing Oregon’s failed Measure 103 in 2018).
In 2021, a superior court judge struck down the penalty provision of California’s soda tax preemption.
See Cultiva La Salud v. State, No. 34-2020-8003458 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 1, 2021) (striking down a
provision of the Keep Groceries Affordable Act which would have deprived cities that passed soda
taxes of all sales-and-use-tax revenue as "financial coercion" that violated the California Constitution's
Home Rule Provision).
39. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 65.870 (West 2018)) (creating a private right of action against a local
official who violated the state firearms preemption and also making it criminal “official misconduct”
for a local official to violate the law); see id. § 65.870(2)–(3), (6); see also id. § 522.020 (first degree
official misconduct); id. § 522.030 (second degree official misconduct).
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Republican-controlled state senate passed it, and a Democratic governor signed
the bill into law.40
As noted above, the COVID-19 pandemic, which was cited by governors
of all states in declaring statewide emergencies in March 2020, has been the
source of numerous clashes between states and their cities and counties.41 In
many of these clashes, the preemptive action of the state often emanated not
from the legislature passing laws, but from the governor or some other executive
official, like the chief of the state’s public health agency, who was usually
appointed by the governor.42 State COVID-19 policy in most states, therefore,
has been driven by the state’s chief executive, who is not always of the same
party as the majority party in both houses of the state legislature.43 Nonetheless,
the “red” governor-“blue” city divide played out in a number of states in this
context, such as Florida, Georgia, and Texas. In those states, governors
unilaterally preempted the powers of local entities to adopt measures like
capacity limits, social distancing, and mask and vaccine mandates.44 The reverse
was also true, of course: many Democratic governors mandated strict virusrelated measures despite fierce resistance from local officials, many of whom
were Republican or—if technically nonpartisan—represented areas with
Republican-leaning sympathies.45
40. See May, supra note 35, at 19–20; F Riehl, Kentucky Governor Signs Three NRA-Backed Bills into
Law, AMMOLAND (Apr. 12, 2012), https://www.ammoland.com/2012/04/kentucky-governor-signsthree-nra-backed-bills-into-law/#axzz7Lq8lleVz [https://perma.cc/ESB9-PPBF].
41. See Weissert et al., supra note 8, at 401–02; see also David Gartner, Pandemic Preemption: Limits
on Local Control over Public Health, 13 N.E. U. L. REV. 733, 735–39 (2021); Bruce D. McDonald III,
Christopher B. Goodman & Megan E. Hatch, Tensions in State-Local Intergovernmental Response to
Emergencies: The Case of COVID-19, 52 ST. & LOC. GOV’T REV. 186, 186 (2020).
42. See, e.g., McDonald et al., supra note 41, at 190.
43. For instance, while many consider Kentucky a “red” state because it has voted Republican
consistently in the last six presidential elections, it has had a Democratic governor since 2019. So, with
respect to Covid policy, Kentucky has more often resembled other “blue states,” at least in terms of the
executive orders Governor Andy Beshear has issued. See Sarah Ladd, These Capacity Rules for
Restaurants, Bars, and Venues Ease Ahead of Memorial Day, LOUISVILLE COURIER J. (May 12, 2021),
https://www.courier-journal.com/story/news/local/2021/05/12/kentucky-covid-19-restrictions-mandat
es-and-rules-to-follow/5035706001/ [https://perma.cc/75BK-43JP] (referring to Beshear’s mask
mandate, capacity, and price-gouging rules); Brian Planalp, Will Kentucky Join Other States in
Lifting Pandemic Orders? Not Likely, FOX19 NOW (Mar. 2, 2021), https://www.fox19.com/2021/03/02/
live-gov-beshear-updates-vaccine-rollout-covid-response-kentucky/ [https://perma.cc/9CXV-4Q9K]
(comparing Kentucky’s response to the responses of other states).
44. E.g., Ga. Exec. Order No. 07.15.20.01 (encouraging the wearing of masks but not requiring
them and prohibiting localities from imposing mandates more stringent than the governor’s order); see
also Complaint at 4–5, Kemp v. Bottoms, No. 2020CV338387 (Ga. Super. Ct. July 16, 2020).
45. See, e.g., Trip Gabriel, G.O.P. Defiance of Pennsylvania’s Lockdown Has 2020 Implications,
N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/14/us/politics/pennsylvania-tom-wolf-coronavirus.
html [https://perma.cc/SD9U-ADRB (dark archive)] (Sept. 21, 2020) (stating that officials in
Republican-led counties resisted Democratic Pennsylvania Governor Tom Wolf’s lockdown orders);
Molly Beck & Patrick Marley, Local Health Officials Are Tossing Their Coronavirus Orders Citing Shaky
Legal Grounds Following Supreme Court Ruling, MILWAUKEE J.-SENTINEL (May 15, 2020),

100 N.C. L. REV. 1469 (2022)

2022]

ENHANCED JUDICIAL REVIEW

1479

As with other issues, the conflicts over COVID-19 policies have not always
been clear-cut disputes between “red” and “blue.” There have been plenty of
intramural conflicts on both sides, with some Democratic mayors feuding with
Democratic governors over the pace and scope of reopening (such as Mayor Bill
de Blasio of New York City and Governor Andrew Cuomo of New York46), and
Republican mayors and county executives having similar disagreements with
Republican governors, such as in Ohio.47
COVID-19 thus emerged as a new battle in a long-running war between
states and cities. While often involving a new mechanism of preemption—the
executive order—this battle occurred within the larger framework of legislative
home rule that leaves cities highly vulnerable to state override. To help shield
cities from what they see as excessive and abusive preemption, the Principles
calls on the judiciary to serve as a check on the other state branches. This Article
will now examine the relative strengths and weaknesses the judiciary would
bring to performing this role.
II. THE JUDICIARY’S INSTITUTIONAL STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES
WITH RESPECT TO PREEMPTION
States’ aggressive narrowing of the scope of home-rule authority through
preemption is much of the impetus behind the Principles.48 Other scholarship
has delved more deeply into the reasons for this increasingly aggressive
legislative behavior, identifying as causes intentional partisan gerrymandering
as well as the outsized influence of certain national and state interest groups
amplified by a relatively unrestrained campaign finance system.49 These are
primarily institutional concerns: in other words, legislatures as currently
https://www.jsonline.com/story/news/politics/2020/05/15/local-health-officials-tossing-their-coronavi
rus-orders-citing-shaky-legal-grounds-following-supreme/5202462002/ [https://perma.cc/TX8W-YL
FP] (stating that cities and counties in Wisconsin stopped complying with COVID-19 restrictions that
Democratic Governor Tony Evers had imposed after the Wisconsin Supreme Court ruled they
exceeded Evers’s authority).
46. Jesse McKinley, Luis Ferré-Sadurní, Dana Rubinstein & Joseph Goldstein, How a Feud
Between Cuomo and de Blasio Led to a Chaotic Virus Crackdown, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 12, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/12/nyregion/cuomo-coronavirus-orthodox-shutdown.html [http://
perma.cc/C46E-L8S9 (dark archive)] (describing de Blasio and Cuomo’s continuing disagreements
over COVID-19 restrictions).
47. Scott Wartman, DeWine Facing GOP Mutiny in Rural Ohio Over Coronavirus, COLUMBUS
DISPATCH (June 30, 2020, 4:40 AM), https://www.dispatch.com/story/news/politics/elections/
2020/06/30/dewine-facing-gop-mutiny-in-rural-ohio-over-coronavirus/112736050/ [https://perma.cc/
FY5M-M4RV] (noting that several Republican-led counties “told the Republican governor he
‘overstepped his bounds’ with the restrictions to prevent the spread of COVID-19”).
48. PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, at 1339 (“States, however, are increasingly violating the spirit of
th[eir] oversight authority [over local governments].”).
49. See Diller, Political Process, supra note 8, at 358–64 (discussing gerrymandering as a
phenomenon behind preemption); ALEX HERTEL-FERNANDEZ, STATE CAPTURE 238–41 (2019)
(discussing the American Legislative Exchange Council’s advocacy of preemption).
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constituted are not functioning in a manner that comports with a preferred
conception of the state-local division of power.
If institutional problems are responsible for legislatures’ preemptive
overreach, one must also apply an institutional lens in assessing how well the
Principles would work in using the judiciary as a bulwark against preemption. In
thirty-eight states, voters elect the state’s highest court judges in some way,
shape, or form.50 Why would elected judges be any more immune to whatever
forces have pushed state legislatures to abuse preemption? This part critically
assesses some of the potential explanations. In doing so, I rely to some extent
on observations I have made in earlier work, in which I argued that the judiciary
had a legitimate role to play in deciding questions of implied preemption.51
A.

Relative Geographic Impartiality

In contrast to the legislature, the judiciary may be better positioned to
enforce a norm of geographic impartiality, under which cities’ potentially
offensive ordinances are treated with some semblance of equality. This is
because in most states, the governor, who is elected statewide, appoints judges,
at least initially, or justices run for office statewide. Hence, the forces of
districting that lead legislatures to represent a geographic slice of the electorate
do not apply equally in the judicial context in most states. In a minority of
states, geography might play a more direct role in high court judges’ selection.
In South Carolina and Virginia, the legislature appoints justices to the high
court.52 In these states, therefore, the same forces that influence the legislature’s
composition overall might trickle down to the courts, although the effect would
be indirect.53
In the eight states that use judicial districts for their high court elections,
the forces at work are countervailing and complicated. Five of these states—
Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Oklahoma—elect their high
court judges directly by district.54 In the three other states—Maryland,
50. See Judicial Selection: Significant Figures, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Oct. 4, 2021), https://
www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/judicial-selection-significant-figures [http://perma
.cc/NYS7-2Y9H] [hereinafter Significant Figures].
51. See Diller, Intrastate Preemption, supra note 28, at 1159–68.
52. See Douglas Keith & Laila Robbins, Legislative Appointments for Judges: Lessons from South
Carolina, Virginia, and Rhode Island, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Sept. 29, 2017), https://www.brennan
center.org/our-work/research-reports/legislative-appointments-judges-lessons-south-carolina-virginia
-and-rhode [https://perma.cc/AQ48-KT4L]. Before 1994, Rhode Island used a similar method but
“scandals led to the abandonment of that system in 1994.” Id.
53. See id. (finding all kinds of problems with Virginia’s and South Carolina’s judicial
appointment systems).
54. See KY. CONST. § 110(4); ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 2 (dividing the state into five judicial
districts for supreme and appellate court judges); LA. CONST. art. 5, § 4 (dividing the state into “at
least six supreme court districts” with at least one judge elected from each); MISS. CONST. §§ 145, 145A, 145-B (establishing districts for the election of supreme court judges); OKLA. CONST. art. VII, § 3.
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Nebraska, and South Dakota—the governor initially selects high court justices,55
and justices later face a retention election within a particular geographical
district.56 In all eight states, the relevant judicial districts are much larger than
state legislative districts.57 The comparatively large size of these judicial districts
is likely to diminish a justice’s allegiance to any particular geographic area. On
the other hand, the U.S. Supreme Court has indicated—without squarely
addressing the issue—that one-person, one-vote does not apply to judicial
elections.58 Hence, states may draw their judicial districts in a manner that
strays from equal apportionment. Maryland, for instance, establishes the
districts for its court of appeals (its high court) in its constitution; the districts
do not change with census data.59 Its districts vary immensely in population
size, with some more than double the size of others.60 Judicial districts that are
exempt from one-person, one-vote, therefore, may open up the door to a state’s
high court skewing in a particular geographical direction.61
In addition to states’ selection mechanisms, it is also worth considering
where justices of a state’s highest court reside. In Oregon, for instance, the
judges of the supreme court—even if selected on a statewide basis—generally
live in Portland, Salem, or Eugene, all within a 110-mile stretch of the state’s
populous Willamette Valley; on the intermediate court of appeals, with thirteen
judges, only one hails from east of the Cascades.62 In states in which the capitol
55. See MD. CONST. art. IV, § 5A(b); NEB. CONST. art. V, § 21(1); S.D. CONST. art. V, § 7.
56. In Maryland, for instance, the retention election is a mere year after gubernatorial
appointment for an additional ten years on the bench. See MD. CONST. art. IV, § 5A(d), (e).
57. In Kentucky, for instance, the state is divided into seven districts for the purposes of supreme
court (and court of appeals) elections. See KY. CONST. § 110(4) (“There shall be one Justice from each
Supreme Court district.”); Map of Supreme Court and Court of Appeals Districts, KY. CT. JUST.,
https://kycourts.gov/Courts/Documents/SC_COA_districtsmap.pdf [http://perma.cc/RD23-WEFP].
The Kentucky Legislature, on the other hand, consists of a Senate with 38 members and a House of
Representatives with 100 members. See KY. CONST. § 33 (enumerating the number of legislators and
districts).
58. See Wells v. Edwards, 409 U.S. 1095, 1095 (1973), aff’g 347 F. Supp. 453 (M.D. La. 1972)
(affirming summarily a district court ruling which held that the Fourteenth Amendment Equal
Protection Clause’s one-person, one-vote principle did not apply to the districts used to elect Louisiana
supreme court justices).
59. MD. CONST. art. IV, § 14.
60. Per 2020 census data, Maryland’s First Appellate Judicial Circuit (which includes Caroline,
Cecil, Dorchester, Kent, Queen Anne’s, Somerset, Talbot, Wicomico, and Worcester counties) has a
population of approximately 458,000. See id.; Quick Facts: Maryland, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/MD [https://perma.cc/E7ZF-XHNM] [hereinafter Quick Facts].
Its Second Appellate Judicial District, which includes Baltimore and Harford counties, has a population
of approximately 1,115,000, which is 2.43 times that of the first. See MD. CONST. art. IV, § 14; Quick
Facts, supra.
61. Some states, such as Kentucky, authorize (but do not require) the legislature to redistrict the
judicial districts over time as population shifts. See KY. CONST. § 110(4).
62. See Steve Powers, The Honorable Roger DeHoog: Oregon Court of Appeals Judge, MULTNOMAH
LAW., June 2016, at 1, 11 (noting that Roger DeHoog was the first lawyer on the court of appeals from
east of the Cascades since Walt Edmonds). Judge DeHoog was subsequently appointed to the Oregon
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is relatively isolated, justices may move there to serve their terms. In theory,
these dynamics could lead to some bias toward the judges’ “home” region or
city, whether the capital or other areas (like Portland and Eugene) within
commuting distance of the capital, although I am unaware of any empirical
studies probing this hypothesis. Moreover, it is possible that with the rise of
remote hearings during the COVID-19 pandemic, state judiciaries may become
more amenable to judges working remotely, which could facilitate a more
geographically diverse judiciary within states.
As discussed below, judges do not generally think of themselves as
“representatives” in the way elected officials do.63 Legislators usually maintain
home-district offices that cater to services of constituents who live only within
their districts.64 Judges, by contrast, at least traditionally, perceive themselves
as beholden to the law, not any particular constituency, and maintain only their
chambers at the court rather than district offices. Any geographic influence,
therefore, is likely subtler than in the legislative environment, but it may vary
to some degree by state depending on the institutional design forces discussed
here.
B.

Tempered Political Insulation

One of the most familiar arguments for judicial intervention, particularly
at the federal level, is that courts and judges, as compared to legislative and
executive branch officials, are more insulated from political pressures.65 In
hoping that judges can better decide questions of state-local power, the Principles
bets on judges’ insulation to some of the political pressures that have driven
legislators to support excessive preemption. Section II.A just discussed how
judges may be more removed from the political pressures that are connected to
geography. However, there are other political pressures that influence state
actors even if they are elected statewide and represent a statewide constituency.
State officials often need to raise money and garner endorsements from interest
groups—businesses, unions, “special interest” organizations, etc.—in order to

Supreme Court. See Press Release, State of Oregon Newsroom, Governor Kate Brown Announces
Appointments to the Oregon Supreme Court and Oregon Court of Appeals (Jan. 19, 2022), https://
www.oregon.gov/newsroom/pages/newsdetail.aspx?newsid=64779 [https://perma.cc/UB67-2H5P].
63. See Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346, 1363
(2006) (“[E]ven where judges are elected, the business of the courts is not normally conducted, as the
business of the legislature is, in accordance with an ethos of representation . . . .”).
64. See Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review?, 101
YALE L.J. 31, 41 (1991) (“Each representative has an incentive to support legislation favoring her
district.”).
65. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 375 (1986); LAWRENCE G. SAGER, JUSTICE
IN PLAINCLOTHES: A THEORY OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE 74 (2004).

100 N.C. L. REV. 1469 (2022)

2022]

ENHANCED JUDICIAL REVIEW

1483

get elected and wield power effectively once in office.66 These dynamics
inevitably influence preemption battles, even within the judiciary.
Because the judges of the highest court of thirty-eight states are elected in
some way,67 they are arguably less politically insulated than their counterparts
at the federal level who enjoy life tenure.68 Nonetheless, in many of these states,
judges are still likely to be subject to less political influence than legislators. In
sixteen of the thirty-nine states with judicial elections, for instance, high court
judges face only uncontested retention elections after their initial
appointment.69 In fourteen of the thirty-nine states with judicial elections, the
races are officially nonpartisan,70 although it is unclear how much this factor
alone reduces the influence of politics on the judiciary.71 More significantly, in
most of the thirty-nine states that have judicial elections, judges are elected or
reelected to terms substantially longer than those of the average legislator,
ranging from six to fifteen years.72 The relative infrequency with which state
high court judges face voters presumably increases their political insulation.73
66. See Interest Groups, USHISTORY.ORG, https://www.ushistory.org/gov/5c.asp [https://perma.
cc/Y5H8-6CFX].
67. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. Some states, such as New York, elect lower-court
judges but not the justices of the high and appellate courts. See Judicial Selection in the State of New York,
FUND FOR MOD. CTS., https://moderncourts.org/programs-advocacy/judicial-selection/judicialselection-in-the-courts-of-new-york/ [https://perma.cc/3BU9-799W] [hereinafter Judicial Selection in
New York]; see also Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of Law,
62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689, 725–26 (1995) (discussing how judges are appointed or elected by each state).
Although these lower court judges may be as susceptible to political pressures as any other elected
official, they are nonetheless compelled to apply the precedent of the state’s less politically pressured
high court.
68. In the twelve states without judicial elections for the high court, judges are perhaps as
insulated from political pressures as their federal counterparts. Some of these twelve states use some
version of nonelective reappointment, while others employ lifetime terms or mandatory retirement
ages. See Significant Figures, supra note 50 (discussing the wide array of judicial selection, retention, and
mandatory retirement systems across the states); see also Croley, supra note 67, at 725–26 (reviewing
wide array of judicial selection mechanisms across the states).
69. Significant Figures, supra note 50. In thirty-eight states, only the high court justices are elected,
whereas in thirty-nine states, judges of any court are elected. Id. The difference maker is New York,
which elects its trial court judges but not intermediate and final appeals court judges. Judicial Selection
in New York, supra note 67.
70. Significant Figures, supra note 50.
71. “[D]espite a great deal of skepticism . . . about whether nonpartisan [judicial] elections differ
materially from partisan elections,” Professors Michael S. Kang and Joanna M. Shepherd found that
the distinction makes a difference with respect to the influence of campaign donations on judicial
decisions. The Partisan Price of Justice: An Empirical Analysis of Campaign Contributions and Judicial
Decisions, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 69, 129 (2011).
72. See State Supreme Courts, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/State_supreme_courts
[https://perma.cc/9ZP4-2AN8].
73. See JED HANDELSMAN SHUGERMAN, THE PEOPLE’S COURTS: PURSUING JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE IN AMERICA 153–54 (2012) (arguing that, historically, longer terms were understood
as better insulating high court judges from party politics and special-interest influence than shorter
terms).
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On the other hand, judicial elections—particularly contested ones as
opposed to mere retention elections—are still elections and thus involve
campaigning and all of its accoutrements, good and bad.74 Candidates need
campaign committees to finance their campaign; they need to raise money from
donors; and they seek endorsements from interest groups and often political
parties even if they are technically nonpartisan candidates.75 The political
pressures of campaigning have led to various incidents seen as damaging the
integrity of the judiciary, particularly where it appears that donors to campaigns
are trying to buy outcomes in a particular case or set of cases.76 Some reformers
have seized on these incidents as grounds for ending judicial elections or, at the
least, reforming them significantly.77
Insofar as decisions regarding the state-local divide implicate the issues
favored or opposed by influential interest groups (and assuming such interest
groups attempt to gain favor with judges through campaign donations and
endorsements),78 there may be good reason to doubt whether the judiciary will
be significantly more politically insulated than the legislature. Particularly in
those states in which supreme court elections are bruising, big-money affairs,
skepticism about the judiciary’s ability to be “neutral” seems quite warranted.
In such states, one might suspect that a four (of seven) justice majority whose
campaigns have been financed heavily by a particular industry might be hardpressed to rule against such an industry in a state-local dispute.79 On the other
74. See, e.g., MELINDA GANN HALL, ATTACKING JUDGES: HOW CAMPAIGN ADVERTISING
INFLUENCES STATE SUPREME COURT ELECTIONS 65–94 (2015) (reviewing studies of campaign
messaging and advertising in judicial elections as well as data on campaigns in the 2000s).
75. See Charles Gardner Geyh, Judicial Selection and the Search for Middle Ground, 67 DEPAUL L.
REV. 333, 338 (2018) (discussing how campaign contributions to and independent expenditures on
behalf of judicial campaigns “exacerbate[] underlying legitimacy problems”). See generally Anthony
Champagne, Interest Groups and Judicial Elections, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1391 (2001) (detailing the
relationship between interest groups and those seeking judicial office).
76. See, e.g., Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 874 (2009) (holding that a West
Virginia Supreme Court justice violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by
failing to recuse himself from a case involving a corporate party whose chief executive officer had
created an independent expenditure organization to benefit the justice’s campaign and donated over $3
million to it). Indeed, Caperton was a case of life imitating art insofar as it resembled the facts of a John
Grisham novel, The Appeal, published one year earlier. See Richard Gillespie, Buying a Judicial Seat for
Appeal: Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., Is Right out of a John Grisham Novel, 30 J. NAT’L ASS’N
ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 309 passim (2010).
77. E.g., ALICIA BANNON, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., RETHINKING JUDICIAL SELECTION IN
STATE COURTS 9 (2016), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2019-08/Report_Rethink
ing_Judicial_Selection_State_Courts.pdf [https://perma.cc/DNJ5-HKX5] (discussing Caperton specifically).
78. See Champagne, supra note 75, at 1392.
79. The empirical data on the effects of campaign contributions on judicial decisions is mixed.
Compare Kang & Shepherd, supra note 71, at 107 (finding that campaign contributions influence judicial
decisions, but “almost exclusively” where judges are selected through partisan races), with HALL, supra
note 74, at 176 (finding that aggressive judicial election advertising campaigns have little effect on voter
behavior).
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hand, state judges face reelection less frequently and in a different manner than
legislators and therefore might be just a bit more resistant to electoral pressures.
Just how “political” a state’s judiciary may be is a matter of degree and is statespecific, and the assessment of a particular state’s judiciary may affect one’s
confidence in that branch’s ability to enforce the Principles impartially.
C.

The Shaming Power of Precedent, or the Aspirational Norm of Judicial
Neutrality

Regardless of manner of selection or election of a state’s high court judges,
stare decisis, at least in theory, inevitably imposes a degree of consistency and
uniformity on the courts’ decisions in the preemption realm. This may be
among the best arguments in favor of involving the judiciary in state-local
disputes and the best rebuttal to the concerns about political influence raised
above. Some might call this dynamic the “shaming power of precedent”—that
is, precedent can shame judges into deciding a case in a way that contradicts
their policy preferences; at the least, it requires them to explain a departure.
The power of precedent over judicial decision-making is inextricably linked to
the long-running debate about whether judges should and are capable of
deciding cases through “neutral principles” regardless of the outcome of the
case.80
When departing from a past decision on state-local distribution of power,
legislators can be as unprincipled as the electorate will allow. Judges, on the
other hand, are at least exposed within the legal community by their hypocrisy.
Indeed, evidence shows that judges care deeply about the respect of their
audiences, including the legal profession.81 The existence of a professional and
even scholarly community scrutinizing a state court’s judicial decisions may
assist in enforcing whatever discipline precedent provides. In this respect,
courts in small states or states without law schools—or without law schools
whose faculty pay any attention to their state supreme courts—may skate by
more easily.
In sum, the institutional forces that affect a judiciary’s makeup,
independence, and ability to police state-local disputes in a principled and
relatively neutral manner will vary by state depending on the features of its
judicial selection system and other aspects of its legal and political culture.

80. See generally Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L.
REV. 1 (1959) (arguing for adherence to “neutral principles”).
81. See LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES: A PERSPECTIVE ON JUDICIAL
BEHAVIOR 18 (2006).
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III. JUDICIAL EXPERIENCE AND TOOLS IN ENFORCING THE STATE-LOCAL
DIVIDE
Asking how the judiciary would police preemption is not a completely
hypothetical question. Rather, as this part discusses, at least two states never
abandoned imperio home rule entirely despite legislative home rule’s
ascendance over the last several decades. Notably, California and Colorado have
both offered some shield-like protection for local authority in their
constitutions.82 Some other states that have a different or less protective version
of a shield against preemption include Minnesota, New York, and Ohio.83 These
states might also be illuminative, but they are less forthrightly protective of
local autonomy, so this part will focus only on California and Colorado in terms
of analyzing how courts have performed recently at protecting cities from
preemption.
In discussing the recent history of judicial home-rule decisions in
California and Colorado, this part also notes how tier-based scrutiny crept into
California’s home-rule jurisprudence almost by accident, while the Colorado
courts have avoided using that methodology. Because the Principles
wholeheartedly embraces California’s importation of federal tier-based scrutiny
as the means for scrutinizing preemptive measures, this part then engages with
some of the larger concerns with and criticism of tier-based scrutiny, both at
the federal and state levels.
A.

How’s It Going? Lessons from California and Colorado

The two states that have retained some version of imperio home rule most
significantly into the early twenty-first century are California and Colorado.
California first adopted steps toward home rule as part of its 1879 constitution,
but in 1896 it put in place what remain some of the most significant, judicially
protected barriers to state preemption in the nation.84 Specifically, the 1896
amendments, as clarified in 1914, preserve “municipal affairs” as an area that

82. I discuss each of these states’ home-rule systems in detail below. See infra Section III.A.
83. See MINN. CONST. art. XII, §§ 1–2 (prohibiting special laws related to local governments
unless agreed to by the local government(s) affected); N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 2(b)(2) (providing that
any special law passed by the legislature that “act[s] in relation to the property, affairs or government”
of a local government remains "subject to the bill of rights of local governments”); OHIO CONST. art.
XVIII, § 3 (allowing for preemption of local authority by the legislature but only through “general
law”); see also PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, at 1369–71 (discussing how Ohio’s “general law” requirement
helps protect local autonomy).
84. See John C. Peppin, Municipal Home Rule in California: I, 30 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 34–41 (1941)
(discussing the background for California’s adoption of the 1879 constitution); John C. Peppin,
Municipal Home Rule in California: II, 30 CALIF. L. REV. 272, 273 (1942) [hereinafter Peppin, Home
Rule II] (discussing the 1896 and 1914 amendments).
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the state may not preempt.85 This language remains part of the California
Constitution and has been the subject of numerous California judicial decisions.
In Colorado, the state’s voters approved amendments in 1902 and 1912
that established certain spheres that are protected from state interference.86 As
a mid-twentieth-century commentator stated, Colorado home rule can be
“[v]iewed as a negative doctrine limiting state legislative interference with local
affairs of a particular municipality, or with particular local matters of concern
to all cities . . . .”87 Colorado’s constitution expressly states that in home-rule
cities, the municipal “charter and the ordinances made pursuant thereto in [local
and municipal] matters shall supersede within the territorial limits and other
jurisdiction of said city or town any law of the state in conflict therewith.”88
Like the California Constitution, this provision of the Colorado Constitution
has been interpreted numerous times by the state’s judiciary in the more-thancentury since its adoption.
1. California
The California courts have long protected home rule through judicial
decisions, though the extent of protection has ebbed and flowed with changing
court membership and issues of the day. In the last decade or so, key battles
over the state-local divide have concerned local elections, land use, and
municipal employment and benefits. The methodology of the California courts
in these contexts provides a useful guide as to how the Principles might work in
application.
The key language in the California Constitution is found in Article XI,
Section 5(a):
It shall be competent in any city charter to provide that the city governed
thereunder may make and enforce all ordinances and regulations in respect
to municipal affairs, subject only to restrictions and limitations provided
in their several charters and in respect to other matters they shall be
subject to general laws. City charters adopted pursuant to this
Constitution shall supersede any existing charter, and with respect to
municipal affairs shall supersede all laws inconsistent therewith.89
As the discussion below demonstrates, the courts have found this
constitutional language to provide the most protection for localities in the realm
of local personnel matters. This record may presage how the Principles, which
specifically grants the highest protection from preemption to local “power to
85. See Peppin, Home Rule II, supra note 84, at 273.
86. Howard C. Klemme, The Powers of Home Rule Cities in Colorado, 36 U. COLO. L. REV. 321,
321–22 (1964).
87. Id. at 322.
88. COLO. CONST. art. XX, § 6.
89. CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 5(a) (emphases added).
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determine the terms and conditions of . . . [municipal] employees,” may work
in application if adopted in toto.90
In interpreting this provision, the California Supreme Court purports to
use an “analytical framework” that derives from a 1991 decision.91 First, the
court determines “whether the city ordinance at issue regulates an activity that
can be characterized as a ‘municipal affair.’”92 Second, the court decides whether
the case presents an “actual conflict” between local and state law.93 Finally, the
court determines whether the law is “reasonably related to . . . resolution of that
[statewide] concern” and “‘narrowly tailored’ to avoid unnecessary interference
in local governance.”94 It is the third part of this analysis that bears the most
resemblance to federal tier-based scrutiny review, and partly inspired the NLC
proposal.95
Before assessing how the California courts have applied this test, including
its tiered-scrutiny third part, it is helpful to trace the history of their
importation of federal jurisprudence. As Professor Tara Grove points out, the
U.S. Supreme Court’s tiers of scrutiny are of “relatively recent vintage.”96 It
was not “until the early to mid-twentieth century” that the Court began to
develop these tiers, and it was even later that they rigidified into the widely
known rules applicable today.97 The California Constitution’s provision on
home rule, however, traces back to the late nineteenth century. So how did a
federal jurisprudential method that developed around 1950 get incorporated
into the California courts’ interpretation of their constitutional home-rule
provision from decades earlier?
The 1991 California Supreme Court decision, California Federal Savings &
Loan Ass’n v. City of Los Angeles,98 appears to be the first time that the court
invoked federal tiers of scrutiny in a home-rule decision. Before that decision,
a Westlaw search reveals no California cases containing the terms “tailored” and
“home rule” or “municipal.” In California Federal Savings & Loan, the court laid
out what sounded like a new test for weighing potentially preemptive state
legislation against the impacted local ordinances: “In the event of a true conflict
90. PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, at 1352.
91. This oft-cited case is Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. City of Los Angeles, 812 P.2d 916 (Cal.
1991). See also State Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council of Cal. v. City of Vista, 279 P.3d 1022, 1027 (Cal.
2012).
92. City of Vista, 279 P.3d at 1027 (citing Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan, 812 P.2d at 924–25).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, at 1367 (citing “narrow tailoring requirement” from a California
case, Johnson v. Bradley, 841 P.2d 990 (Cal. 1992)).
96. Tara Leigh Grove, Tiers of Scrutiny in a Hierarchical Judiciary, 14 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 475,
475 (2016).
97. See Richard Fallon, Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1284 (2007) (“Before 1960,
what we would now call strict judicial scrutiny . . . did not exist.”).
98. 812 P.2d 916 (Cal. 1991).
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between a state statute reasonably tailored to the resolution of a subject of
statewide concern and a charter city tax measure, the latter ceases to be a
‘municipal affair’ to the extent of the conflict and must yield.”99 Despite
articulating the test this way, the court then went on to conclude that the state
law in question, despite needing only to be “reasonably tailored” to the
resolution of the statewide issue it addressed, was actually “narrowly tailored”
to that end.100 By passing a test stricter than the one applicable to it, the state
law passed with flying colors!
Despite initially articulating and applying its tier-based scrutiny test this
way, over the next several years the test metamorphosed further. A key decision
along this doctrinal path came a year later in Johnson v. Bradley.101 In Johnson, the
court transformed the test for state preemption from “reasonably” tailored to
“narrowly” tailored. It did this by altering a quotation from California Federal
Savings & Loan: “If, however, the court is persuaded that the subject of the state
statute is one of statewide concern and that the state statute is reasonably related
[and ‘narrowly tailored’] to its resolution,” then the legislature may preempt.102
So within one year, “reasonably tailored” became “narrowly tailored,” which
presumably is a significant increase in the level of scrutiny applied. More recent
cases from the intermediate appellate court say that a potentially preemptive
statute must be “reasonably related” to a statewide goal but “narrowly tailored”
to avoid “unnecessary” infringement on “municipal affairs.”103
Even as the California Supreme Court ratcheted up the level of scrutiny,
it has never required that the state interest in the potentially preemptive
legislation be any more than “reasonably related” to “resolution of the issue of
statewide concern” addressed by the legislation.104 Having said that, the courts
have made clear that this part of the test does not offer carte blanche to any
state law. Rather, a court must “identif[y] a convincing basis for legislative
action originating in extramunicipal concerns, one justifying legislative
suppression based on sensible, pragmatic considerations.”105 Also, the state must
show that “under the historical circumstances presented, the state has a more
substantial interest in the subject than the charter city.”106 The latter sounds a
bit like a “substantial state interest,” or perhaps like the balancing that comes
under the narrow tailoring test. Indeed, requiring the state to show a “more
substantial interest in the subject” would be just a straightforward balancing of
99. Id. at 918 (emphasis added).
100. Id. at 930.
101. 841 P.2d 990 (1992).
102. Id. at 996 (alteration in original).
103. Jauregui v. City of Palmdale, 172 Cal. Rptr. 3d 333, 342 (Ct. App. 2014) (citing Cal. Fed.
Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 812 P.2d at 925).
104. See id.
105. Id. at 344.
106. Id.
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the two relevant “interests,” akin to the old imperio approach of adjudging a
matter “statewide” or “local.” But in the very same opinion, the California
Supreme Court said that that it aimed to avoid “compartmentalization” of areas
of governmental activity “as either a municipal affair or one of statewide
concern.”107
With the exception of the Los Angeles public campaign financing scheme
at issue in Johnson, the California courts have almost uniformly upheld state
legislation as “narrowly tailored” in terms of their imposition on local
government. The appellate cases upholding state laws preempting local
ordinances span a wide array of subjects, including immigration, land use, pay
and procedural protections for municipal employees, local firearm regulation,
and appeals processes for building code citations.108
In the area of municipal employees and contractors, however, much like
local elections in Johnson, the California Supreme Court has shown a special
solicitude for local control.109 In State Building & Construction Trades Council v.
City of Vista,110 despite the state legislature’s finding of numerous statewide
interests as reasons for a municipal contractor prevailing wage statute, the court
rejected the idea that the legislation furthered a statewide concern as a matter
of law.111 The court cited the narrow nature of the statute (as opposed to a
general minimum wage, for instance) as well as the fact that it infringed upon
local “autonomy [regarding] the expenditure of public funds,” which the court
viewed as “at the heart of what it means to be an independent governmental

107. Id.
108. See City of Huntington Beach v. Becerra, 257 Cal. Rptr. 3d 458, 463 (Ct. App. 2020) (holding
that the California Values Act, which restricted the ability of local law enforcement agencies to inquire
into immigration status, place individuals on an immigration hold, and use personnel or resources to
participate in certain immigration enforcement activities, “addressed matters of statewide concern—
including public safety, health, effective policing, and protection of constitutional rights,” was
“reasonably related to resolution of those statewide concerns,” and was “narrowly tailored” to
addressing those matters); Lippman v. City of Oakland, 229 Cal. Rptr. 3d 206, 217 (Ct. App. 2017)
(holding that state law requirements for resolution of appeals affecting property owners did not
impermissibly infringe on the city’s home-rule powers because the appellate process therein was
“narrowly tailored to ensure uniform application of state law”); Marquez v. City of Long Beach, 244
Cal. Rptr. 3d 57, 76 (Ct. App. 2019) (holding that the statewide minimum wage as applied to a charter
city’s employees addressed a matter of statewide concern and was “appropriately tailored” to address
statewide concern in the health and welfare of workers); see also Fiscal v. City & County of San
Francisco, 70 Cal. Rptr. 3d 324 (Ct. App. 2008) (upholding statewide preemption of local firearm
regulation, but without employing a “narrow tailoring” analysis); Morgado v. City & County of San
Francisco, 220 Cal. Rptr. 3d 497 (Ct. App. 2017) (upholding state Public Safety Officers Procedural
Bill of Rights against a city attempt to terminate a police officer).
109. See, e.g., State Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council of Cal. v. City of Vista, 279 P.3d 1022, 1034
(Cal. 2012).
110. 279 P.3d 1022.
111. Id. at 1034.
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entity.”112 Because no statewide concern was presented, the majority easily
found that this law failed the test articulated in California Federal Savings &
Loan.
In one of two dissents, Justice Werdegar understandably faulted the
majority for relying on a Depression-era case that “interpreted a different law
long ago eclipsed by more modern economic ideas.”113 Justice Werdegar also
faulted the majority for “significantly undervalu[ing] the statewide economic
concerns the law addresses . . . .”114 Indeed, Justice Werdegar thought that the
issue of whether the law promoted a “statewide concern” was “not a close
question.”115 Namely, Werdegar brought up the statewide benefit of
municipalities paying prevailing wages and the effect of such a requirement on
apprenticeship programs.116 Justice Liu also offered a piercing dissent in which
he criticized the majority’s approach as a return to the rigid
“compartmentalization” of statewide and municipal affairs.117
Clearly, whether the prevailing wage rates for city contractors is a matter
of “statewide concern”—or, in the language of the Principles, an “overriding state
interest”—is a question lacking an easy answer. City of Vista certainly offers
reason to wonder why judges are better able to answer this question than the
legislature.118 Hence, California’s example demonstrates that the judiciary’s
heightened involvement in home-rule questions may, at times, offer some
additional protection from preemption to cities, but a system of tier-based
scrutiny is also likely to be unpredictable and leave much discretion in the
courts.
2. Colorado
The other prominent state that uses a form of home rule in which the
judiciary plays a robust role in protecting certain areas of local decision-making
from state preemption is Colorado, whose home-rule provision dates back to
the early twentieth century.119 Like California, Colorado identifies certain areas
112. Id. (“[W]e conclude that no statewide concern has been presented justifying the state’s
regulation of wages that charter cities require their contractors to pay to workers hired to construct
locally funded public works.”).
113. Id. at 1035 (Werdegar, J., dissenting).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1038.
116. Id. at 1040.
117. See id. at 1048 (Liu, J., dissenting).
118. It is worth noting that the prevailing wage statute struck down in City of Vista might separately
qualify as an unconstitutional “unfunded mandate” under the Principles. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 3,
at 1353 (prohibiting states from requiring cities “to provide additional services or undertake new
activities without providing an additional appropriation that fully funds the newly mandated service
or activity”).
119. For a good summary of the history of municipal home rule in Colorado, see Howard C.
Klemme, The Powers of Home Rule Cities in Colorado, 36 U. COLO. L. REV. 321 (1964).
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that qualify as “local and municipal matters” for the purpose of home-rule
analysis, including the terms and tenure of municipal employees and local
elections.120 These provisions give municipal litigants and others solid textual
ammunition to attack state legislation that invades these areas, if not others.
Unlike California, the Colorado courts do not purport to balance state and
local interests for matters of “local concern.” Local legislation in areas
exclusively of “local concern” trumps preemptive state legislation outright.121
The key inquiry, therefore, happens before analysis of the conflict, at the
categorization stage. At that stage, Colorado courts determine whether an issue
is a matter of “local,” “statewide,” or “mixed” concern.122 In the case of the latter
two, state legislation triumphs in the case of a conflict with local action.123
To determine which “compartment” a particular matter falls into, the
Colorado courts employ an analysis that relies on at least four factors: “(1) the
need for statewide uniformity of regulation; (2) the extraterritorial impact of
local regulation; (3) whether the matter has traditionally been regulated at the
state or local level; and (4) whether the Colorado Constitution specifically
commits the matter to state or local regulation.”124 On a few isolated occasions,
federal scrutiny-like language has seeped into Colorado jurisprudence.
However, for the most part, Colorado’s judiciary applies the four-part test in
its own way. Rather than examine whether the state’s interest is “compelling”
or “substantial,” the courts have used the term “sufficiently dominant,” but
usually only in the context of analyzing implied preemption—i.e., determining
whether the enacted legislation evinces an intent to occupy the field, for
instance.125
So, to the extent that Colorado courts balance statewide versus local
interests, they do so in their application of the first two factors: the need for
statewide uniformity and the extraterritorial impact of local action.
Interestingly, on these factors, the Principles cautions that “[i]t is not enough for
120. See COLO CONST. art XX, § 6(a)–(h) (including language on municipal employees, police
and municipal courts, municipal elections, municipal bonds, park and water district consolidation,
assessment and levy of taxes and special assessments, and assessment and collection of fines).
121. City of Longmont v. Colo. Oil & Gas Ass’n, 369 P.3d 573, 579 (Colo. 2016) (“[I]n matters
of local concern, a home-rule ordinance supersedes a conflicting state statute.”); City & County of
Denver v. Qwest Corp., 18 P.3d 748, 754 (Colo. 2001) (en banc) (noting that a home-rule municipality
“has plenary authority to regulate matters of local concern”).
122. See Colo. Oil & Gas Ass’n, 369 P.3d at 579.
123. Id. (“[W]hen a home-rule ordinance conflicts with state law in a matter of either statewide or
mixed state and local concern, the state law supersedes that conflicting ordinance.”); Voss v. Lundvall
Bros., Inc., 830 P.2d 1061, 1066 (Colo. 1992) (en banc) (“[I]n a matter of purely statewide concern a
state statute or regulation supersedes a conflicting ordinance of a home-rule city.”).
124. Webb v. City of Black Hawk, 295 P.3d 480, 486 (Colo. 2013).
125. E.g., Colo. Min. Ass’n v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Summit Cnty., 199 P.3d 718, 724 (Colo.
2009) (“Sufficient dominancy is one of several grounds for implied state preemption of a local
ordinance.”).
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a state simply to decry the lack of uniformity, as local variation is inherent to
any regime of home rule.”126 The Principles further urges “courts [to] evaluate
skeptically claims that statewide uniformity is necessary in any given context,”
and also assert that “[t]he claim that a given local law has external effects
should . . . be evaluated skeptically.”127 Indeed, the Principles remains neutral
when citing one case that upheld state preemption by implication and another
case that concluded the preemption was express.128 For preemption to succeed
on factors like Colorado’s first and second, the Principles makes clear that the
regional or statewide effects of the local policy must be both “demonstrable and
substantial.”129
There is some similarity in form and substance between Colorado’s
approach and that of the Principles, even if the similar inquiries occur at different
stages of the process. In practice, Colorado courts have sustained preemptive
laws that address matters of natural resource extraction, while displaying a
mixed record in other land use and zoning cases. For instance, in a prominent
recent case, City of Longmont v. Colorado Oil & Gas Ass’n,130 the Colorado
Supreme Court considered whether a city’s ban on hydraulic fracturing—also
known as fracking—could be trumped by the state’s Oil and Gas Conservation
Act.131 The court ruled that the local ban affected a matter of mixed statewide
and local concern.132 In assessing the need for statewide uniformity of
regulation, the court relied on an earlier precedent, which recognized that
subterranean pools of oil and gas often transcend municipal boundaries.133 In its
analysis of the second factor—the extraterritorial impact—the court cited the
potential increased cost of producing oil and gas, if limited to those parts of a
pool outside the city, and the effect that such a limitation would have on
royalties.134 So far, so good, even under the Principles. But then the court went
on to cite the potential “ripple effect” of other cities adopting an ordinance like
Longmont’s and cited a case that warned of a “patchwork of local . . . rules.”135

126. PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, at 1345.
127. Id. at 1368.
128. Id. (first citing City of Northglenn v. Ibarra, 62 P.3d 151 (Colo. 2003) (en banc) (finding that
a city ordinance prohibiting unrelated sex offenders from living together in single-family homes in the
city was impliedly preempted by state laws that govern the foster care system); then citing Webb v.
City of Black Hawk, 295 P.3d 480 (Colo. 2013) (finding that a city ordinance banning bicycles on
virtually all of its streets conflicted, and was expressly preempted by, a state statute requiring that cities
allow bikes on streets unless they provided an alternative bike path nearby)).
129. Id.
130. 369 P.3d 573 (Colo. 2016).
131. Id. at 577.
132. Id. at 581.
133. Id. at 580 (citing Voss v. Lundvall Bros., 830 P.2d 1061 (Colo. 1992) (en banc)).
134. Id. at 581.
135. Id. (citing Webb v. City of Black Hawk, 295 P.3d 480, 491 (Colo. 2013)).
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The Principles, by contrast, specifically cautions against accepting the patchwork
argument, although it does not rule it out entirely.136
On matters of land use and zoning, the Colorado courts have a mixed
record. The Colorado Supreme Court has upheld a statewide ban on rent
control as applied to a town’s inclusionary zoning ordinance,137 citing the state’s
“significant interests in maintaining the quality and quantity of affordable
housing in the state.”138 Such language would presumably bode well for
statewide zoning reforms designed to promote affordable housing similar to
those now being introduced or considered in several states.139 On the other
hand, the court in the same opinion also noted that “state residents have an
expectation of consistency throughout the state” regarding “[l]andlord-tenant
relations.”140 This kind of logic is redolent of the “private law exception” to
home-rule authority that the Principles readily rejects.141
The Colorado Supreme Court also upheld statewide telecommunications
easements as against conflicting local programs142 and separately struck down
restrictions on sex offender residency that cities have defended as zoning
ordinances.143 In the latter, while applying the four-part test for determining
whether a matter is of “statewide,” “local,” or “mixed” concern, the court found
the state’s interest in housing foster children “sufficiently dominant” to override
the local regulation because it was a matter of implied preemption.144 For the
most part, therefore, in Colorado, the state can usually find a way to justify its

136. PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, at 1368 (“Because a diversity of regulatory approaches is one of the
benefits of local self-government, courts should evaluate skeptically claims that statewide uniformity is
necessary in any given context.”).
137. Town of Telluride v. Lot Thirty-Four Venture, LLC, 3 P.3d 30, 32 (Colo. 2000) (en banc).
138. Id. at 38.
139. See, e.g., Act of Aug. 8, 2019, ch. 639, 2019 Or. Laws 2011 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of OR. REV. STAT.); Act of Aug. 8, 2019, ch. 640, 2019 Or. Laws 2018 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of OR. REV. STAT.); Act of June 10, 2021, Pub. Act No. 21-29, 2021 Conn. Legis.
Serv. 1, 8–12 (West); see also Christopher S. Elmendorf, Beyond the Double Veto: Housing Plans as
Preemptive Intergovernmental Compacts, 71 HASTINGS L.J. 79, 83, 114–16 (2019) (analyzing California’s
preemptive intergovernmental compact to plan for more housing and allow greater density in existing
residential zones).
140. See Town of Telluride, 3 P.3d at 38.
141. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, at 1355 (“This provision pointedly does not include a ‘private
law exception’ to local power . . . .”) (citing, inter alia, Diller, Private Right of Action, supra note 27, at
1109).
142. City & County of Denver v. Qwest Corp., 18 P.3d 748, 751 (Colo. 2001) (en banc).
143. City of Northglenn v. Ibarra, 62 P.3d 151, 153 (Colo. 2003) (en banc). But see Ryals v. City
of Englewood, 364 P.3d 900, 903 (Colo. 2016) (answering a certified question from a federal appellate
court and finding no conflict between state law and a local ordinance that effectively banned sex
offenders from ninety-nine percent of a city).
144. City of Northglenn, 62 P.3d at 163; see also Voss v. Lundvall Bros., 830 P.2d 1061, 1068 (Colo.
1992) (en banc) (concluding that the state’s interest in oil and gas is “sufficiently dominant to override”
a local ban on drilling).
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preemption of local authority as involving a matter of at least “mixed” statewide
and local concern.
In at least one other land-use case, however, the locality has won. The
Colorado Supreme Court upheld Telluride’s use of extraterritorial eminent
domain; it did so not because it found a distinct “local” as opposed to
“statewide” or “mixed,” interest but because the state constitution specifically
committed this power to home-rule cities.145 Indeed, the Colorado Supreme
Court’s focus on the constitutional text provides the key, perhaps, to the other
cases in which Colorado municipalities have prevailed in conflicts with state
laws attempting to preempt local laws.
In the municipal employment context, for instance, the Colorado Supreme
Court held that the state could not require certain training of Denver sheriff’s
deputies.146 Much of the majority’s reasoning focused on the state constitution’s
textual commitment of employment matters to home-rule cities.147 The dissent,
by contrast, would have given more credit to the extraterritorial interests
presented by law enforcement.148 Combined, these cases demonstrate the
importance of textual commitment of a specific area to local regulation in
Colorado home-rule jurisprudence.
Colorado’s example is a reminder that any state considering the Principles
should, for instance, be particularly careful about the language in Section D.2,
which, among other things, recognizes a home-rule government’s “power to
determine the terms and conditions of its employees.”149 As applied to the
Denver sheriff’s deputy case, the state’s interest in mandatory training,
assuming that it was considered a “term” or “condition” of employment, would
need to pass the higher of the Principles’ two scrutiny tests: “narrowly tailored”
to “advance an overriding state concern.” It is difficult to see how the Colorado
law would have survived that test, but there will, of course, inevitably be much
discretion in applying it.

145. Town of Telluride v. San Miguel Valley Corp., 185 P.3d 161, 167 (Colo. 2008) (en banc)
(“Article XX [of Colorado’s constitution] expressly authorizes home rule municipalities to condemn
properties outside of their territorial boundaries, necessarily implicating interests which are not ‘purely’
local. Where the constitution specifically authorizes a municipal action which potentially implicates
statewide concerns, the municipality’s exercise of that prerogative is not outside the bounds of its
authority.”).
146. Fraternal Ord. of Police, Colo. Lodge # 27 v. City & County of Denver, 926 P.2d 582, 584–
85 (Colo. 1996) (en banc).
147. Id. at 591–92 (“[T]he jurisdiction, term of office, duties and qualifications of all . . . officers [of
the city and county of Denver] shall be such as in the charter may be provided . . . .” (quoting COLO.
CONST. art. XX, § 2)).
148. Id. at 596 (Lohr, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Denver deputy sheriffs . . .
have substantial ‘extraterritorial impact’ in performing their duties as peace officers in Denver, the
State capital and center of commerce.”).
149. PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, at 1352.
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Indeed, the commentary to Section D of the Principles notes that the
presumption against preemption “is likely to be especially strong [in the
municipal employment context] because the decisions concerning local
government structure and organization are particularly unlikely to have
extralocal consequences.”150 In his partial dissent in Fraternal Order of Police,
Colorado Lodge # 27 v. City & County of Denver,151 however, Justice Lohr
emphasized Colorado’s “significant interest in setting minimum training and
qualification standards applicable to peace officers who serve as Denver deputy
sheriffs” due to the potential extralocal consequences of their behavior and
duties.152 Justice Lohr may have used the term “overriding” if that were the
standard called for under the applicable analysis, as in the Principles. Even if
“overriding,” under the Principles, the state would still bear the burden of
showing that the legislation is “narrowly tailored” to advance the state’s
“overriding concern.”
In sum, California and Colorado provide examples of what some courts
are currently doing in policing the state-local divide. While the Principles differs
in the ways explored above, it may well entrench a system that protects local
autonomy over employees and contractors. Such protection might limit the
state’s authority to regulate prevailing wages and require minimum training
standards for public safety officers throughout the state, but they could also
work in reverse and protect higher local contractor wages and heightened
training and supervision requirements.153 The commentary to the Principles
anticipates that adoption of the model language would require courts to strike
a delicate balance in this area.154 Since the Principles proposes the use of tierbased scrutiny as the means for striking this balance, the next part of this Article
homes in on the potential pitfalls of courts using that method for evaluating
action by the political branches.

150.
151.
152.
153.

Id. at 1373.
926 P.2d 582 (Colo. 1996) (en banc).
Id. at 595–96 (Lohr, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
See NESTOR DAVIDSON, RICK SU & MARISSA ROY, LOC. SOLS. SUPPORT CTR.,
PREEMPTING POLICE REFORM: A ROADBLOCK TO SOCIAL JUSTICE 5 (2021), https://static1.
squarespace.com/static/5ce4377caeb1ce00013a02fd/t/6176eb48b158eb2ed44100e4/1635183433487/Pre
emptingPoliceReform-October2021.pdf [https://perma.cc/92JF-YSZT] (“State laws have insulated
police departments from local accountability for decades . . . .”).
154. PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, at 1378 (noting that “local control of the . . . municipal workforce
is not absolute” and that “[s]tates may . . . want to require local governments to meet reasonable,
generally applicable . . . equity[] or labor standards, although costly state mandates should generally be
accompanied by state aid”).
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IV. TIER-BASED SCRUTINY REVIEW IN THE FEDERAL AND STATE
COURTS: ALTERNATIVES AND CRITICISM
Home rule is not the only area of state constitutional law into which
federal scrutiny-based, tier-level analysis has crept for assessing challenges to
governmental action. Numerous state courts now rely on this form of analysis
for interpreting all sorts of state constitutional provisions, including those that
protect freedom of expression or require equal or uniform treatment of persons
or entities by the law.155 Some state courts even use scrutiny tiers and a tailoring
analysis to analyze state constitutional provisions that have no cognate in federal
constitutional law, such as provisions that protect the “right to a remedy”—that
is, relief in civil court when suing for a tort.156 This part explores concerns about
tier-based scrutiny as a jurisprudential tool as such, as well as more specific
concerns about importing it into state constitutional law.
A.

Tier-Based Scrutiny Review in the Federal Courts

Scholars have offered myriad critiques of federal tier-based scrutiny
jurisprudence,157 often deriding it for being “overly rigid” and “mechanical.”158
So much of tier-based scrutiny review depends on the level of scrutiny to be
applied, with that determination essentially preordaining the outcome of a legal
challenge.159 Other criticisms fall into two camps: scrutiny-based review is either
too lax in upholding legislation under the guise of “rational basis” review,160 or

155. See, e.g., Connerly v. State Pers. Bd., 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 5, 19 (Ct. App. 2001) (“Although our
state constitutional guarantee [of equal protection] is independent of the federal guarantee, in the
context of this case it is, with one exception, applied in a manner identical with the federal guarantee.”);
Coleman v. City of Mesa, 265 P.3d 422, 432 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2011) (using federal terms of art to analyze
free speech protection simultaneously under Article 2, Section 6, of the Arizona Constitution and the
First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution).
156. See David Schuman, The Right to a Remedy, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 1197, 1204 (1992) (noting that
one “typology” among state courts uses “federal ‘level of scrutiny’ terminology to describe different
treatments of the remedy guarantee” (citing Janice Sue Wang, State Constitutional Remedies Provisions
and Article I, Section 10 of the Washington State Constitution: The Possibility of Greater Protection of
Established Tort Causes of Action and Remedies, 64 WASH. L. REV. 203, 208–11 (1989))).
157. Tara Leigh Grove, Tiers of Scrutiny in a Hierarchical Judiciary, 14 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 475,
487 (2016) (“[S]cholars have severely criticized the tiers of scrutiny established by the [U.S.] Supreme
Court.” (first citing Randy E. Barnett, Scrutiny Land, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1479, 1484 (2008); then citing
Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 481, 484, 491–92 (2004))).
158. Id. at 487.
159. Id. at 485–86 (“As Kathleen Sullivan has pointed out, ‘[t]he key move in litigation under a
two-tier system is steering the case onto the preferred track. The genius of this tracking device is that
outcomes can be determined at the threshold without the need for messy balancing.’” (quoting Kathleen
Sullivan, Post-Liberal Judging: The Roles of Categorization and Balancing, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 293, 296
(1992))).
160. This criticism often comes from economic conservatives; Randy Barnett, for instance, is a key
proponent of such views. See RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE
PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 339, 345–48 (2014) [hereinafter BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST
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it is too harsh because it strikes down too much of whatever falls into “strict
scrutiny.”161 In assessing the Principles, it is the second of these two critiques that
would be most relevant, since the proposal expressly and newly empowers
judges to invalidate state legislation.
The criticism of scrutiny-based review as too judge-empowering and harsh
has spanned the ideological gamut. In the 1960s and 1970s, some of the most
prominent criticism came from the right end of the ideological spectrum, as the
U.S. Supreme Court used heightened scrutiny to strike down limitations on
contraception, abortion, legal distinctions between the genders, and
government regulation of free speech and association.162 As the Court
increasingly used strict scrutiny to invalidate, inter alia, affirmative action and
other race-based programs with an ameliorative purpose,163 campaign finance
regulations,164 and government regulation of commercial “speech” to protect
public health and consumers165 criticism of scrutiny-based review increasingly
emanated from the left.166
Critics of scrutiny-based review have generally looked more favorably on
other methods of judicial review—either from the Supreme Court’s past or from
other nations—that they consider more flexible and profitable. The two most
CONSTITUTION]; Randy E. Barnett, Keynote Remarks: Judicial Engagement Through the Lens of Lee
Optical, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 845, 859–60 (2012).
161. See, e.g., Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Law in an Age of Proportionality, 124 YALE L.J. 3094,
3178 (2015) [hereinafter Jackson, Age of Proportionality] (“A standard focused not only on the nature of
the classification but also on the relative nature of the harm complained of and its relationship to the
particular government interests at stake would allow courts the flexibility to hold legislatures
accountable without invalidating most legislation.”).
162. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965) (striking down a state law
prohibiting the sale or use of contraceptives); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 166 (1973) (striking down a
Texas state law prohibiting abortion at any stage of pregnancy); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197
(1976) (adopting a heightened-scrutiny standard for analyzing legal distinctions between genders);
Fallon, supra note 97, at 1292–93 (discussing the Warren Court’s use of strict scrutiny). For criticism
of the Warren Court’s use of strict scrutiny to protect “fundamental” rights, see generally PHILIP B.
KURLAND, POLITICS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE WARREN COURT (1970).
163. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 320 (1978) (holding that a
university’s special admissions program based on race violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment); see also City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 551–52 (1989)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (criticizing the application of strict scrutiny to “race-conscious remedial
measures”).
164. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 143 (1976) (holding that limitations on campaign
expenditures by a candidate are unconstitutional).
165. See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
770 (1976) (holding that the First Amendment protects commercial speech).
166. For overall criticism of the Supreme Court’s rightward shift in individual rights, see MARY
ANNE FRANKS, THE CULT OF THE CONSTITUTION: OUR DEADLY DEVOTION TO GUNS AND FREE
SPEECH (2019); JEFFERSON DECKER, THE OTHER RIGHTS REVOLUTION: CONSERVATIVE
LAWYERS AND THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (2016); AMANDA HOLLIS-BRUSKY,
IDEAS WITH CONSEQUENCES: THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY AND THE CONSERVATIVE
COUNTERREVOLUTION (2015).
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commonly invoked alternatives to scrutiny tiers are reasonableness, often said
to be the Supreme Court’s method for assessing rights-based claims before the
advent of the current system, and proportionality-based review, associated with
the constitutional courts of foreign nations like Canada and Germany.167 Under
the first approach, the Supreme Court of the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries asked whether legislation was “reasonable”; the fulfillment of this
criterion was necessary for a piece of legislation to be a valid exercise of the
state’s police power.168 Perhaps unsurprisingly, “reasonableness” as a
jurisprudential method was highly unpredictable; its demands could be
understood more or less stringently by different judges, even in the same case.169
Some scholars, however, have suggested reviving something like a
reasonableness standard of review. Like Professor Randy Barnett, some think it
better protects liberty—including economic liberty—than current review
models,170 while others prefer a unified review mechanism like reasonableness
to the “simplistic” rigidity of tier-based scrutiny review.171
In contrast to reasonableness review, proportionality review assesses the
constitutionality of a challenged governmental action more contextually. Under
proportionality review, which the Supreme Court has used only in a couple of
discrete contexts, larger harms imposed by the government should be justified
by weightier reasons.172 Proportionality review is quite popular in other legal
systems, with the United States often seen as an “outlier” in not using the
methodology to the same degree.173 Different countries’ judiciaries administer
it differently; Canada, Germany, and Israel, for instance, include in their
analyses a question of whether the intrusion on the challenger’s rights can be
justified by the benefits of achieving an important public goal.174
167. On proportionality, see, for example, Jamal Greene, Rights as Trumps, 132 HARV. L. REV. 28,
34 (2018); Jackson, Age of Proportionality, supra note 161; on reasonableness, see, for example, Jeffrey D.
Jackson, Putting Rationality Back into the Rational Basis Test: Saving Substantive Due Process and Redeeming
the Promise of the Ninth Amendment, 45 U. RICH. L. REV. 491, 493 (2011) (advocating for “the adoption
of a strengthened rational basis test that would allow courts to scrutinize the actual purpose behind
legislation and demand that the legislation actually be reasonably related to its valid legislative
purpose”).
168. E.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 56 (1905) (asserting that courts must determine if an
exercise of the police power is “fair, reasonable, and appropriate”).
169. Fallon, supra note 97, at 1286–87.
170. See BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION, supra note 160, at 160–61; see also
Steven G. Calabresi, The Originalist and Normative Case Against Judicial Activism: A Reply to Professor
Randy Barnett, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1081, 1093 (2005) (reviewing BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST
CONSTITUTION, supra note 160) (“Barnett seems to think the Fourteenth Amendment is a large blank
check to judges to sit in judgment on the reasonableness of state laws.”).
171. See, e.g., Goldberg, supra note 157, at 581–82.
172. Jackson, Age of Proportionality, supra note 161, at 3098 (discussing the Supreme Court’s use of
proportionality review in the context of the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment
as well as in reviewing the assessment of punitive damages under the Fourteenth Amendment).
173. Id. at 3096.
174. Id. at 3098–101 (discussing the concept of “proportionality as such”).
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Advocates of proportionality in the United States have argued that this
form of “balancing” better protects rights and provides a “relatively systematic,
transparent, and trans-substantive doctrinal structure.”175 Professor Jamal
Greene, for instance, looking to other countries’ examples, has praised
proportionality as a “structured approach to limitations on rights” that provides
“a transsubstantive analytic frame, a kind of intermediate scrutiny for all.”176 It
“invites parties with a diverse set of commitments to remain invested in the
constitutional system rather than alienated from it” in part because “they might
win tomorrow,” if they did not win today, “on different facts.”177
By explicitly adopting the tier-based scrutiny system as opposed to
something like proportionality or reasonableness review, the Principles
potentially invites judges to strike down all manner of preemptive statutes that
violate the “rights” of local governments.178 This is clearly not the intent of the
proposal. The commentary makes clear that preemption ought to be allowed in
certain instances.179 But the text’s inherent vagueness, coupled with the use of
tier-based scrutiny, could lead some judges, who largely take their cues on
applying tier-based scrutiny from the federal judiciary, to invalidate much
preemptive legislation. The fans of proportionality, on the other hand, would
likely suggest that the methodology is preferable for resolving questions that
fall within the zone of “epistemic uncertainty”—that is, where it is far from
clear whether there is truly a “statewide” interest at stake and how “overriding”
or “substantial” it is.180 Proponents of reasonableness might prefer its flexibility
to the Principles’ tier-based scrutiny for preemption, even while recognizing that
as a standard it might be unpredictable.
One intriguing but limited possibility for resolving some state-local
disputes under the Principles comes from one of its authors, Professor Nestor
Davidson. Davidson has argued that in deciding state-local disputes, courts
should look for “normative guidance” to the “[s]tate constitutional individualrights provisions [that] address[] equality and equity in many states, as well as
employment, education, social welfare, and the environment.”181 Davidson cites
175. Jud Mathews & Alec Stone Sweet, All Things in Proportion? American Rights Review and the
Problem of Balancing, 60 EMORY L.J. 797, 797 (2011).
176. See Greene, supra note 167, at 58.
177. See id. at 84.
178. Indeed, one of the Principles’ most vocal critics, and a participant in this symposium, has found
this fault. See David Schleicher, Constitutional Law for NIMBYs: A Review of ‘Principles of Home Rule for
the 21st Century’ by The National League of Cities, 81 OHIO ST. L.J. 883, 905 (2020) (noting that the
Principles would give “judges . . . tons of new tools to strike down” state limitations on local zoning
authority by requiring narrow tailoring and substantial justification).
179. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, at 1345.
180. Jackson, Age of Proportionality, supra note 161, at 3145 (quoting ROBERT ALEXY, A THEORY
OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 399–401, 411–18 (Julian Rivers trans., 2010)).
181. Nestor M. Davidson, The Dilemma of Localism in an Era of Polarization, 128 YALE L.J. 954,
954 (2019).
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New Jersey’s famous case, Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of
Mount Laurel,182 case as a paradigmatic example, in that it relied on the state’s
“general welfare” clause to limit local zoning authority that had excluded lowerincome residents.183
Davidson’s proposal might work better within a proportionality or
reasonableness framework rather than the rigid scrutiny framework. In
assessing the validity of state preemption of a local fracking regulation, for
instance, a court would weigh environmental protection (if that commitment is
expressed in the state constitution, as it is in several states) against the state’s
interest in promoting economic growth and energy resource capabilities to
environmental protection.184 In such a situation, proportionality allows for more
focus on what a local government that seeks to ban fracking is trying to achieve
than does tier-based scrutiny in weighing such a ban against a state law
preempting such bans.185 Reasonableness, while uncertain, also may allow for
more flexibility than a tier-based scrutiny regime.
B.

Tier-Based Scrutiny in State Courts and Resistance Thereto

In addition to the ample criticism of tier-based scrutiny as a
methodological tool, practiced by courts in whichever jurisdiction, prominent
voices in the state constitutional law community have criticized state courts’ use
of tiers of scrutiny as copycat jurisprudence ill-suited to the state court system.
Oregon Supreme Court Justice—and former University of Oregon law
professor—Hans Linde, who argued strenuously for the independent meaning
of state constitutions,186 believed that the tiers of scrutiny used by the federal
courts did not adapt well to state constitutional jurisprudence.187 Among the
many downsides of scrutiny-based review, for Linde, at least in the individual
rights context, was that it “centralize[s] decision-making in Washington, in the
Supreme Court of the United States.”188 Linde challenged the legal
182. 336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975).
183. Davidson, supra note 181, at 993–94 (citing S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP, 336 A.2d 713).
184. Robinson Township v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 999–1000 (Pa. 2013) (invalidating state
law preempting local fracking regulation based on the state constitution’s Environmental Rights
Amendment); see also Jeffrey Omar Usman, Good Enough for Government Work: The Interpretation of
Positive Constitutional Rights in State Constitutions, 73 ALB. L. REV. 1459, 1475 (2010) (“At least thirteen
state constitutions . . . impos[e] a duty upon the state to safeguard the environment.”).
185. Alternatively, a judiciary could consider a state’s normative commitments in adjudging the
reasonableness of state preemptive legislation.
186. See, e.g., Hans A. Linde, The State and Federal Courts in Governance: Vive la Différence, 46 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1273, 1273 (2005).
187. Hans A. Linde, Who Must Know What, When, and How? The Systemic Incoherence of “Interest
Scrutiny,” in PUBLIC VALUES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 219, 239 (Stephen E. Gottlieb ed., 1993).
See generally Hans A. Linde, The Shell Game of “Interest” Scrutiny: Who Must Know What, When, and
How?, 55 ALB. L. REV. 725 (1992) [hereinafter Linde, Shell Game] (arguing that the “interest” scrutiny
regime employed by federal courts undermines states’ rights).
188. Linde, Shell Game, supra note 187, at 733.
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professoriate to “look beyond the Supreme Court,” an institution that he
believed was too often law professors’ “single focus” and “only source of
doctrine.”189
Although coming from the perspective that tier-based scrutiny review was
ill-suited to state constitutional law, many of Linde’s critiques apply more
generally to the methodology as well. These include:
1. People individually and collectively have interests, whereas states,
as legal or governmental entities, hardly ever do; rather, they “pursue
objectives, purposes, and policies.”190
2. “The word ‘compelling’ denotes compulsion,” but little in the
Constitution compels the state to do anything.191
3. The formula “demands a series of discrete, highly debatable steps”
in the lawmaking process—identifying and assigning a value to the
government’s purpose, determining how the chosen means will work in
practice, and ascertaining whether an alternative means will serve well
enough at less cost to the opposing value—that might be desirable if
possible, but are not currently prescribed by any constitution.192
4. There are numerous difficulties in requiring judges to discern
legislators’ purpose in enacting statutes.193
To be fair, Linde’s third criticism might be less apposite insofar as the
Principles would arguably prescribe such steps in the lawmaking process, but that
then begs the question of whether such an imposition is realistic or desirable.
Preemptive legislation is often part of larger legislative packages in which local
autonomy is traded away as a bargaining chip toward policy objectives
supported by some of the local officials whose governments are losing power in
the deal.194 Applying Linde’s third criticism to the preemptive prong of such an
overall package illustrates a potential impracticality of the Principles’ approach.
Although he may have expressed frustration with the prevailing legal
landscape, Linde was hardly shouting into the void. Some state courts have
quite forthrightly parted course from a mechanical grafting of federal scrutinybased analysis onto their own state constitutional provisions. In Washington,
189. Id. at 736–37.
190. Id. at 726.
191. Id. To be sure, unlike the Federal Constitution, state constitutions impose affirmative—one
might say “compulsory”—obligations on states, such as providing public education. See generally
Usman, supra note 184 (reviewing such provisions). On the distinction between positive and negative
rights, and an argument that almost all rights in the Federal Constitution are negative, see Frank B.
Cross, The Error of Positive Rights, 48 UCLA L. REV. 857 (2001).
192. Linde, Shell Game, supra note 187, at 727.
193. Id.
194. Diller, Political Process, supra note 8, at 400–01 (discussing preemption that results from a
legislative bargain).
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for instance, the state supreme court has made clear in interpreting its Equal
Rights Amendment that “the ERA absolutely prohibits discrimination on the
basis of sex and is not subject to even the narrow exceptions permitted under
traditional ‘strict scrutiny.’”195 In other states, however, courts have “corrected”
temporary departures from the federal jurisprudential framework.196 In sum, the
criticism of tier-based scrutiny in general and the disagreements regarding
importing federal jurisprudence into state constitutional law interpretation
suggest that states should proceed cautiously—and evaluate carefully alternative
methods and constitutional text—in considering Sections C.2 and D.5 of the
Principles.197
CONCLUSION
The problems with excessive preemption very much mirror problems with
state democracy generally—and, indeed, democracy generally—within the
United States at this present, tenuous moment.198 The rollout of the Principles,
therefore, is fortuitously timed to be part of larger discussions of fixing state
democracy generally. Given the connection between preemption and
gerrymandering, it is useful to connect home-rule reform to reform of how
states draw state legislative districts. Pursuing such reforms to reduce the
polarities of the partisan splits in legislatures, often exacerbated by
gerrymandering, can help create a legislative process in which cities have a fairer
shot at getting their priorities heard. Respecting local boundaries in districting
(which can, ironically, exacerbate urban areas’ disadvantage in the legislature
overall) might nonetheless lead to more unified delegations in the statehouse,
allowing cities—at least big cities—to better pursue their priorities.199 This may
be particularly effective in states where cities themselves are “purple,” like
Phoenix and Orlando; perhaps it could promote a sense of representing the city
rather than representing a party.200
Another issue to focus on in strengthening state democracy is campaign
finance reform, which, of course, is currently on “life support” as a policy choice
195. Sw. Wash. Chapter, Nat’l Elec. Contractors Ass’n v. Pierce County, 667 P.2d 1092, 1102
(Wash. 1983) (“The ERA mandates equality in the strongest of terms and absolutely prohibits the
sacrifice of equality for any state interest, no matter how compelling, though separate equality may be
permissible in some very limited circumstances . . . .”).
196. E.g., Cmty. Res. for Just., Inc. v. City of Manchester, 917 A.2d 707, 721 (N.H. 2007)
(overruling Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825 (N.H. 1980), in part, “to make our [intermediate scrutiny]
test [under the state constitution] more consistent with the federal test”).
197. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, at 1347–48.
198. See Michael J. Klarman, Foreword: The Degradation of American Democracy—and the Court, 134
HARV. L. REV. 1 passim (2020).
199. See Paul A. Diller, Toward Fairer Representation in State Legislatures, 33 STAN. L. & POL’Y
REV. 135, 159 (2022) (discussing the relationship between political geography and the partisan
composition of state legislatures).
200. See JONATHAN A. RODDEN, WHY CITIES LOSE 114–15 (2019).
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due to the ideological predilections of the current Supreme Court. Insofar as
cities are good lobbyists, but lack that additional tool of campaign contributions
that other interest groups wield (with ferocity), limits on political donations
from individuals, businesses, and labor unions and even candidate spending
overall could help level the playing field between interest groups and cities.
Enhanced judicial review of preemption is one option for empowering
local democracy, but so is systematic reform of state democracy. No one would
argue that all preemption is bad; the question in many ways is about how it is
produced. Does it result from a process in which cities had a chance to be heard?
Does it come out of a legislature that fairly represents the statewide voting
public? Do some interest groups have an outsize role due to campaign
contributions? These are all questions reformers should be asking as they
consider ushering in a new era of home rule. Answers may vary by state, due to
types and populations of cities, as well as underlying political geography, but
these are important questions to ask and attempt to answer, and to think about
carefully before inviting the judiciary back in to policing the state-local divide.

